Reinforcement learning theory has produced important insights into economic behavior. Intriguingly, neuroscientists recently discovered a plausible mechanism through which reinforcement may be encoded in the brain. Yet their resulting "dopaminergic reward prediction error" hypothesis has not yet been incorporated into economics. We develop an axiomatic model that characterizes the empirical implications of this theory for an idealized data set comprising both neuroscientific measurements and choices. Our axiomatization removes the language barrier between economics and neuroscience. This will allow "neuroeconomic" experimental protocols to be developed appropriate to the questions motivating economic, as opposed to purely neuroscientific, interest in learning.
Introduction
Understanding how people learn about their environment is crucial in understanding their economic decisions.
Theories of how such learning takes place have served in the past as a vital interface between social and natural science. Reinforcement learning theory in particular (Bush and Mosteller [1951] ) has come to play an important bridging role between economics (e.g. Erev and Roth [1998] and Camerer and Ho [1999] ), psychology (Rescorla and Wagner [1972] ), and neuroscience (Schultz et al. [1997] ). Interest in this theory has recently been reinvigorated by the discovery of a plausible mechanism through which reinforcement may be encoded in the brain. Yet the transfer of new insights across disciplinary boundaries has proven problematic. To break these barriers down,
we develop an axiomatic model that formalizes recent neuroscientific insights in a language suitable for economic research.
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter whose release was originally hypothesized to reflect "hedonia", as when a thirsty monkey is given a squirt of juice. Yet Schultz et al. [1993] found that if such a monkey learned to associate a particular sound with later receipt of fruit juice, the dopaminergic response occurred when that sound was heard, not when the juice was received. Following up on this finding, Schultz et al. [1997] hypothesized that dopamine broadcasts a "prediction error" signal precisely of the form needed in reinforcement algorithms to drive convergence toward a standard dynamic programming value function (Barto and Sutton [1982] ). Dubbed the dopaminergic reward prediction error (DRPE) hypothesis, this claim has been tested using a variety of neuroscientific techniques.
While neuroscientific findings in relation to learning have many potential economic applications, there is a profound language barrier that makes new insights difficult to transfer across disciplinary boundaries. For example, neuroscientists generally interpret reinforcement learning in terms of hedonic experience rather than in the choice theoretic manner favored by economists. Gul and Pesendorfer [2007] argue that such definitional differences doom "neuroeconomic research" of the form advocated by Glimcher [2003] and Camerer et al. [2005] to failure. Rather than look for a framework within which to connect field-specific abstractions, Gul and Pesendorfer argue for the continuation of the current "Mindless Economics", in which use of neuroscientific data is tightly restricted:
"the requirement that economic theories simultaneously account for economic data and brain imaging data places an unreasonable burden on economic theories."
We believe that neuroeconomic research will live up to its potential only if the Gul and Pesendorfer challenge is faced head on. To break down the current language barrier, we need theories that indeed do simultaneously account for economic and brain imaging data. The axiomatization of the DRPE hypothesis of neuroscience presented herein is of just this form. The axiomatic approach enables us to define neurological abstractions directly in terms of their empirical implications, removing the essential language barrier between neuroscientific and economic theory. We characterize the DRPE hypothesis for an idealized data set comprising neuroscientific measurements as well as choices. The axioms suggest experimental protocols directed to the central tenets of the theory, rather than to particular parametrizations.
In addition to clarifying the empirical content of the DRPE hypothesis, the axiomatic method enables us to illuminate a missing link in current testing protocols. It is typical in these tests to treat the reward prediction error as a cardinal concept. Yet our central result justifies only an ordinal version of the DRPE hypothesis. While anticipated and realized rewards are well-defined in this characterization, the reward prediction error is not. We provide additional assumptions that do animate this prediction error, yet know of no neuroscientific research that validates these assumptions. Just as the ordinal revolution in economics reshaped understanding of marginal utility, so the axiomatic approach to neuroeconomics will reshape the understanding of reward prediction errors.
It is important to note that this paper represents only a first step in developing a neuroeconomic model of learning. We characterize a model in which dopamine responds to the difference between experienced and predicted reward. Such a model is a vital precursor to the development of theories in which dopamine forms part of a neural reinforcement learning system. It remains for future work not only to fully characterize this class of learning models, but also to develop yet richer models of learning based on additional neuroscientific and choice data.
Section 2 discusses the prior literature on dopamine, learning, and choice, and outlines our neuroeconomic research agenda. Section 3 introduces our analytic framework, and the DRPE representations that we characterize. Section 4 introduces the three critical axioms that underlie the DRPE hypothesis. Section 5 establishes the basic representation theorem for purely dopaminergic data. Section 6 establishes additional results, in particular characterizing when dopamine can be used as a measuring rod for reward differences, and how it may connect to choice. Section 7 concludes by looking forward to the next stages of our larger research agenda.
Background 2.1 Reinforcement Learning in Economics
The importance of learning theory in economics is made clear by the effort that has been dedicated to it both within macroeconomic theory (e.g. Marcet and Sargent [1989] and Evans and Honkapohia [2001] ) and microeconomic theory (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine [1998] ). Much of this work makes striking departures from the supposedly standard assumption that inference is Bayesian. One reason for this is that, absent a theory of priors, the Bayesian framework places few restrictions on behavior. Another is that realistic Bayesian models are highly computationally complex. Anticipating such problems, Simon [1955] early on proposed looking toward the reinforcement model of animal learning for inspiration. More recently, Erev and Roth (1998) history-based models. He finds that when payoffs are determined by a hidden state that changes over time, agents adapt rapidly to the unsignaled change in the environment. Charness and Levine [2003] also show that changes in the environment impact whether or not experimental subjects exhibit reinforcement learning. Little consensus has as yet emerged on how to model learning in realistic environments, in part because choices do not provide a clear window into current beliefs, since they reflect in addition the ever present incentive to uncover new information. 
The DRPE Hypothesis and the Neuroscience of Learning
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter, a chemical that transmits information from one brain cell (or neuron) to another.
A connection between neurons across which such communication can take place is called a synapse. When a presynaptic neuron "fires" (a discrete change in voltage called an "action potential"), a neurotransmitter is released, which then travels across the synaptic cleft and attaches itself to a receptor in the post-synaptic neuron. The term dopamine (or dopaminergic) neuron refers to any neuron that releases dopamine as a neurotransmitter when it fires. There are two main ways of measuring activity in dopaminergic neurons. Single cell recordings in animals measure action potentials directly, using electrodes inserted into the animals brain. In humans, fMRI imaging measures the amount of oxygenated blood present in a particular brain area, providing an indirect measure of activity.
Two important features of dopamine neurons are the apparently common structure of the fluctuations in the underlying activity rate and the wide broadcast of the corresponding signal. Hence many neuroscientists hypothesize that dopamine neurons have a coherent and important message to transmit to other neural areas.
Some powerful hints have recently emerged concerning the possible nature of this message. Studies have shown increases in activity in dopaminergic neurons in response to the receipt of food, drink, social reinforcers, drugs of abuse and sex (see Berridge and Robinson [1998] for a review), suggesting that dopamine responds positively to some form of "reward". Recent work has confirmed that larger such "rewards" lead to higher activity in dopamine neurons: Tobler et al [2005] show that activity in these neurons is positively correlated with the amount of fruit juice received by thirsty monkeys. Furthermore, fMRI studies have shown a similar pattern of activity in the ventral striatum and other areas which receive dopaminergic signals in humans. Knutson and Peterson [2005] show that activation in the ventral striatum relates to the anticipation of monetary gains in a magnitude proportional way.
In line with the standard reward-based interpretation of dopamine, Schultz et al. [1993] demonstrated an increase in dopaminergic activity when a monkey was unexpectedly given a squirt of fruit juice. Yet they went one step further, motivated in part by the Pavlovian learning model of Rescorla and Wagner [1972] . They found and Schotter [2002] ).
that if the monkey learned to associate a particular sound with the later receipt of the fruit juice, the dopaminergic response occurred when that sound was heard, not when the juice was received. Moreover when cued rewards failed to arrive, dopamine neurons exhibited a momentary pause in their background firing. These findings suggest that dopamine tracks the path over time of the difference between some form of anticipated and realized reward value. Intriguingly, Schultz, Dayan, and Montague [1997] noted that this "prediction error" signal is precisely what is needed in reinforcement learning algorithms designed by computer scientists to approximate standard dynamic programming value functions (Barto and Sutton [1982] ). This has led many researchers to conclude that this similarity is no coincidence, and that dopamine does indeed measure a reward prediction error that is used to update an evolving value function.
Various different forms of evidence have been gathered that appear supportive of the hypothesis. O'Doherty et al. [2006] show that the receipt of more preferred foods (as measured by choice) leads to higher activation in dopaminergic output areas. are consistent with the idea that there may be multiple modes of learning. Depending on specific neurological manipulations, there can be wholesale changes in the extent to which past rewards dominate future behavior. In an effort to understand observations of this form, Dickinson and Balleine [2002] have developed a two-process theory of the motivation, with only one of these two processes involving the dopamine system. Balleine [2005] is currently investigating the development of "habits" as opposed to more flexible responses, and an associated "supervisory function" that determines the extent to which habitual behavior is called into play in any given situation.
Neuroeconomic Research: Benefits and Barriers
Economists are fundamentally interested in how to model the learning process. Yet the range of possible models is bewilderingly large, and the evidentiary base with which to discriminate among them is thin. In principle, advances in neuroscientific understanding have the potential to provide economists with much relevant information. If we can determine that dopamine does form part of a reinforcement learning module in the brain, understanding how it works can help us to answer several important questions. When is the reinforcement learning system active?
Is reinforcement a process that can take place at different speeds depending on internal and external cues? To what extent does the speed of learning and the persistence of past reinforcement provide an adequate behavioral model of habituation? Can we use neuroscientific techniques to understand when and where these various speeds and styles of learning are engaged? Can the relative influence on behavior of past and present experiences be impacted by specific neurological interventions?
Given this rich set of unanswered questions, it would seem like a very good time for economists to join neuroscientists in designing the next generation of research on learning. Such research forms part of a movement to broaden the evidentiary base of economics. Yet there are some basic communication problems that must be resolved before neuroeconomics can achieve its full potential. These problems are particularly striking in the theory of reinforcement learning, since economists and neuroscientists have entirely different interpretations of the fundamental concept of a "reward". In economics such concepts are inferred from observed choices, while neuroscientists interpret them in relation to intuitions concerning the flow of experience (e.g. a squirt of juice is assumed to be rewarding to a thirsty monkey). In fact, many neuroscientific tests of the DRPE hypothesis take the perspective of "classical" or "Pavlovian" conditioning, in which choice plays no role, rendering economic interpretation difficult at best (the recent paper of O'Doherty et al. [2006] is an exception in this respect).
We believe that the need for increased theoretical precision is evident even when one reviews the DRPE in its purely neuroscientific context. While follow up studies broadly confirm the pioneering finding of Schultz et al. [1993] concerning dopaminergic responses to unexpected rewards, several of them uncover other factors that may influence the rate of dopaminergic response. In particular the qualitative fMRI studies of Zink et al. [2003] , Delgado et al. [2005] and Knutson and Peterson [2005] suggest that dopamine responses may be modulated not only by a reward prediction error but also by less reward-specific "surprise", or "salience". In an effort to refine the evidence, significant effort has been put into the design of quantitative tests (e.g. Montague and Berns [2002] Bayer and Glimcher [2005] , O'Doherty et al. [2003, 2004] , Daw et al [2006] and Li et al. [2007] ). These tests combine the DRPE hypothesis with a reinforcement learning model, imposing an external definition of reward (typically an affine transformation of some measured reward, such as fruit juice or monetary value), and assuming that expectations are generated using a standard reinforcement algorithm. Based on these assumptions, one can generate an estimated reward prediction error associated with any sequence of stimulus-prize pairs. Measured fMRI activity in dopaminergic output areas is regressed on this sequence, with a strong positive correlation taken as confirmatory of the DRPE hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the current testing methodology has profound limitations. One problem is that the calculated prediction error is very highly correlated with, and could therefore be similarly explained by, other relevant measures such as the magnitude of the reward itself. While one might use statistical methods to discriminate among models, these will at best produce a ranking of the considered alternatives, rather than a global statement on model validity. A second and more fundamental problem is that even if the DRPE hypothesis is correct in the most literal of senses, the current hypothesis test could reject it due to the implicit assumption that the fMRI signal is related to the prize according to an affine transformation. Yet no justification has ever been provided for limiting attention to this simple class of transformations. Neuroeconomic research needs to follow the lead of utility theory, and internalize the perils of treating an ordinal reward function as if it was cardinal. Axiomatic methods represent the obvious way forward in this regard, since they enable one to characterize the measurability properties of all variables that are defined within the theory.
Given the limitations of the tests that have been conducted to data, it is little surprise that neuroscientific controversies remain. While the early view that dopamine encodes the pleasure or "hedonia" associated with a particular event is now largely discredited, there are other alternatives to the DRPE hypothesis that still have powerful support. For example, papers by Zink et al. [2003] and Aron et al. [2004] suggest that dopamine output responds in part to "unpredictability" per se, or "salience" rather than just to reward prediction error. The "incentive salience" hypothesis of Berridge and Robinson [1998] holds that dopamine responds to how "wanted" a stimulus is, which is separate from how much a stimulus is "liked". Redgrave and Gurney [2006] suggest that dopamine plays a role in "switching attention" between different possible events. We see our work as providing a set of simple tests which allow the DRPE hypothesis to be characterized.
The Axiomatic Approach
Neuroeconomic research has many proponents, such as Glimcher [2003] [2004] ). Yet the recent critique by Gul and Pesendorfer [2007] has called into question the underlying premise of this work, arguing against the need to constrain economic models to explain neuroscientific data.
While we agree with the proponents in terms of potential, it is nevertheless our conviction that neuroeconomic research will live up to its potential only if interdisciplinary agreement is reached concerning the basic theoretical building blocks. Our research ideal is both to help establish a new theoretical language for neuroeconomics, and to utilize it in experimental contexts.
The current paper represents a small first step in our broad neuroeconomic research agenda. The DRPE hypothesis represents the perfect starting point, since it is a neuroscientific model of great potential interest to economists. We use axiomatic methods to characterize the empirical implications of this hypothesis for a data tape with combined information on choice and dopaminergic activity. Ironically, we see the axiomatic methodology as even more important when modeling novel neuroscientific data than in its standard decision theoretic setting. It enables us to define theoretical abstractions such as rewards, predictions, and the DRPE hypothesis itself, in a direct and precise empirical language. If the data do not obey our axioms, then the DRPE model is fundamentally wrong, not merely misspecified. Moreover, just as axiomatic reasoning was key in helping economists gain precision on when such concepts as diminishing marginal utility could and could not be invoked, so the uniqueness result attached to the representation theorem pins down how meaningful are the reward numbers in any formulation of the DRPE hypothesis. 
Prizes, Outcomes, and Dopaminergic Responses
We develop the DRPE hypothesis for a case in which probabilities are objective and dopaminergic responses derive from realizations of specific lotteries over final prizes. This simple "lottery-outcome" framework enables us to formulate our model without reference to any particular model of learning.
The first essential element in our framework is the idealized data set. We consider a setting in which the agent is either endowed with or chooses a specific lottery from which a prize is realized. We observe both any initial act of choice among lotteries, and the dopaminergic response when each possible prize is realized. Definition 1 lays out the fundamental building blocks of the theory.
Definition 1
The set of prizes is a metric space Z with generic element z ∈ Z. The set of all simple lotteries over Z is denoted Λ, with generic element p ∈ Λ. We define e z ∈ Λ as the degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 to prize z ∈ Z and the set Λ(z) as all lotteries with z in their support,
The DRF specifies an idealized measure of the observed dopamine release when prize z is realized from lottery p. The restriction of the domain to p ∈ Λ(z) reflects the inability to observe dopamine responses to prizes that are ex ante impossible. Many of the subtleties of the theory that follow derive from this restriction on the domain of observation. 2 We endow Λ with the metric
The Basic DRPE representation
The DRPE hypothesis hinges on dopaminergic responses being somehow determined by the relationship between "expected" and "experienced" rewards associated with any pair (z, p) ∈ M . In this paper, we make the further assumption that the expected reward of a degenerate lottery is equal to its experienced reward as a prize. 3 Hence the natural technical translation of the hypothesis involves a function r : Λ → R which defines the expected reward associated with each lottery and that simultaneously induces the reward function on prizes z ∈ Z as r(e z ).
We define r(Z) as the set of values taken by the function r across degenerate lotteries,
A basic assumption underlying the DRPE hypothesis is that this reward function contains all information relevant to dopamine release. We say that the reward function fully summarizes the DRF if this is the case.
Definition 2 A function r : Λ → R fully summarizes a DRF δ : M → R, if there exists a function E :
In this case we say that r and E represent the DRF.
A DRPE representation rests not only on the ability to represent the DRF, but also on the dopaminergic response having appropriate order properties. The dopaminergic response should be strictly higher for a more rewarding prize from a given lottery than for a less rewarding one. Furthermore, a given prize should lead to a higher dopamine response when obtained from a lottery with lower predicted reward. The broad version of this principle is contained in the following definition.
Definition 3
We say that a pair of functions r and E which represent a DRF respect dopaminergic dominance if E is strictly increasing in its first argument and strictly decreasing in its second argument.
Finally, in addition to depending on existence of an appropriate reward function, the DRPE hypothesis rests on the assumption that, if expectations are met, the dopaminergic response does not depend on what was expected.
We refer to this property as no surprise constancy.
Definition 4
We say that a pair of functions r and E which represent a DRF satisfy no surprise constancy if, given x, y ∈ r(Z), E(x, x) = E(y, y).
We say that a DRF admits a DRPE representation if we can find functions that satisfy these three conditions. 
Dopamine and Cardinality
It is intuitively clear from the definition that if r : Λ → R forms part of a DRPE representation of a DRF δ : M → R, then so does any function r * : Λ → R that is a strictly increasing monotone transform of r. 4 Hence this representation does not allow one to treat dopamine as an invariant measure of the reward difference or "error", just as the notion of marginal utility is ill-defined for standard ordinal utility functions. We develop a more restrictive additive representation that represents the minimum requirement for using dopaminergic response to animate the notion of reward difference/error.
Definition 6 A DRF δ : M → R admits a dopaminergic additive reward prediction error (DARPE)
representation if there exists a function r : Λ → R and a strictly increasing function G :
Except for the degenerate lotteries, we have thus far placed no restrictions on the relationship between predicted reward and the realized rewards of the prizes in the support of the lottery. An extreme strengthening of the DRPE hypothesis is to demand instead that the predicted reward be computable as the mathematical expectation of the rewards associated with these prizes. Given the natural analogy with expected utility theory, we refer to this as an expected reward representation. Note again that this is a specialization of the DRPE representation.
However, it neither implies nor is implied by the DARPE representation.
Definition 7 A DRF δ : M → R admits a dopaminergic expected reward prediction error (DERPE)
for some function u : Z → R, where µ p [u] denotes the expected value of u : Z → R with respect to the lottery p.
"Rewards" and Choice
Throughout this paper we refer as the function r : Λ → R in our representation as the "reward function", based on experimental evidence suggesting that dopamine responds to stimuli intuitively considered to be rewarding.
Yet in all of the above characterizations, a dopaminergic system that ranked a sure bet of $10 above a sure bet of $100 could support an RPE representation, as long as it did so in a consistent manner. Rewards are defined only in relation to dopaminergic activity, just as in classical revealed preference theory utility is defined through choice, and choice of $10 over $100 reveals the former to be preferred to the latter. If the basic DRF permits a DRPE characterizations, there exists a definition of reward such that dopamine responds consistently to that definition, while it does not, no such reward definition can be found.
While the approach we are taking is intellectually aligned with the revealed preference approach to choice theory, it will be of little interest to economists unless the reward function is somehow related to choice behavior.
One such relation would be if choices among lotteries could be modeled as deriving from maximization of the DRPE reward function. It is this simplest of cases that we characterize below.
Definition 8
The choice correspondence C is defined on all compact sets X ∈ 2 Λ , with C(X) ⊆ X denoting the non-empty set of lotteries chosen from any finite subset of the lottery space. A DRF δ : M → R and a choice correspondence C admit a choice-consistent DRPE representation if there exist r : Λ → R, E : r(Z) × r(Λ) −→ R that form a DRPE of δ : M → R, and for all X ∈ Q,
While this case is of obvious interest to economists, it represents an extreme form of the DRPE hypothesis.
A more standard scenario involves dopamine as simply one component of a richer overall process of learning and of choice, as indicated in section 2.
4 Necessary Conditions
Three Axioms
We introduce three critical axioms for δ : M → R to admit a DRPE. Our first axiom ensures coherence in dopaminergic responses to prizes: if one prize is more of a positive surprise than another when received from some lottery, then it must be so for any other lottery. Our second axiom provides the analog condition with respect to lotteries: if an outcome z leads to a bigger dopamine release when obtained from one given lottery than from some other lottery, then the same must be true for any other outcome that is in the support of both lotteries. The final axiom characterizes the dopamine function as having equivalent value all along the 45-degree line. property whereby δ 1 must be everywhere above δ 2 , δ 2 must be everywhere above δ 1 , or they must be everywhere equal; A2 implies that the two functions are co-monotonic; and A3 pins the functions down to have identical end points at their respective origins. That these conditions are necessary for a DRPE representation is demonstrated in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 A DRF δ : M → R must satisfy A1-A3 in order to admit a DRPE representation.
Proof. Consider any DRF which admits a DRPE representation, and let r, E correspondingly represent the
To establish that the DRF satisfies A1, note that, since r and E form a DRPE,
where the first and fourth implication follow from the fact that r fully summarizes δ, and the second and third implications follow from the fact that r and E respect dopaminergic dominance.
An analogous argument shows us that A2 holds:
Finally, we combine the fact that E and r represent the DRF with the fact that Definition 4, no surprise constancy, is satisfied in any DRPE representation, to conclude that given z, z 0 ∈ Z, δ(z, e z ) = E(r(e z ), r(e z )) = E(r(e z 0 ), r(e z 0 )) = δ(z 0 , e z 0 ), confirming that A3 holds.
Necessary, but not Sufficient: An Example
While necessary, A1-A3 are not sufficient for a DRPE representation. Consider a case with three prizes, Z = {A, B, C}, and in which dopamine functions satisfy A3 with δ(A, e A ) = δ(B, e B ) = δ(C, e C ) = 1. All remaining values of the DRF are specified in the following table, where the row labels correspond to belief arguments in which only named prizes have strictly positive probability.
The table summarizes a DRF in which the dopaminergic response to prizes depends only on the identities of the prizes that were ex ante possible in that lottery. To interpret the table, note that the entry of 8 in the first row and column implies that the dopaminergic response upon winning prize A from any lottery p = (p A , p B , p C ) with
We confirm first that this DRF indeed satisfies A1 and A2 (A3 is immediate). The key to confirming A1 is the fact that the columns have been uniformly ordered so that the entries in each row strictly diminish from left to right. This means that in order to identify distinct prizes such that δ(z, p) > δ(z 0 , p) for some p, it must be that the column that represents receipt of prize z lies to the left of that representing receipt of prize z 0 . The fact that this same order of dopamine release across these two prizes applies to other beliefs is immediately revealed by the fact that all other rows obey the same ordering. To check A2, note that if for all other prize pairs. In terms of the matrix, the condition that is being checked is that whenever two distinct rows both have numerical entries in two distinct columns, the two distinct row entries sit in the same numerical order in each column.
To see that no DRPE representation exists in this case, we show that there can be no function r : Λ → R that forms part of a DRPE representation. If such a function were to exist, it is shown in Proposition 1 to imply that,
Application of this logic leads to the putative reward function r : Λ → R produces the following cycle, and with it a contradiction:
Discussion
The example of non-existence above derives from the fact that the domain of the dopamine function differs across prizes: distinct prizes z, z 0 ∈ Z are associated with distinct sets Λ(z) 6 = Λ(z 0 ) ⊂ Λ. It is precisely these domain differences that allow A1-A3 to be consistent with the matrix above. It is in this respect that the domain differences open up the possibility for the cycle of dopaminergic dominance, and with it the contradiction to the DRPE representation.
There are many other forms example in which A1-A3 is satisfied, and yet no DRPE representation is possible.
First, even if one can rearrange rows and columns and prevent lottery cycles of the form above, one can uncover contradictions between the ordering of the rows and the ordering of the columns, relating in particular to the degenerate lotteries. Second, A1-A3 allow cases in which a simultaneous switch to an apparently "more rewarding" prize realized from an apparently "less rewarding" lottery reduces rather than raises dopamine. The final problem that can prevent the availability of the DRPE hypothesis is existence of fully coherent dopaminergic responses that are not representable by any numerical function (this is analogous to the non-existence of a utility function representing lexicographic preferences). We show in the next section that appropriate continuity conditions remove all such barriers to existence.
A Continuous Representation Theorem

A1-A3 and Extended DRF
The examples of non-existence hinge on the fact that the DRF has a non-rectangular domain: M is a not a Cartesian product. To understand how crucial is the issue of domain, we show in Theorem 1 that existence of a DRPE representation is equivalent to the function δ : M → R being extendible to the rectangular domain Z × Λ in a manner that retains A1-A3. • A1*: Given z, z 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ,δ(z, p) >δ(z 0 , p) ⇒δ(z, p 0 ) >δ(z 0 , p 0 );
Proof. (Sufficiency). Suppose that a DRF δ : M → R permits a DRPE representation, and let r : Λ → R and E : Z × Λ → R correspondingly represent the DRF. Now define the functionδ : Z × Λ → R by, δ(z, p) = E(r(e z ), r(p)).
By construction, this is an extension of the DRF. Consider now z, z 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ, and note that, as in proposition 1, the fact that A1* and A2* hold is established by noting their respective equivalence to the following statements:
The truth of both statements is a direct result of the dopaminergic dominance property of r : Λ → R and E :
Finally, noting that ∀ z ∈ Z, {z, e z } ∈ M , direct application of Definition 4, no surprise constancy, implies that for any z, z 0 ∈ Z, δ(z, e z ) = δ(z, e z ) = δ(z 0 , e z 0 ) =δ(z 0 , e z 0 ), confirming that A3* holds.
[Necessity] Assume that there exists a functionδ : Z × Λ → R which: (a) is an extension of δ : M → R;
and (b) satisfies A1*-A3* on this domain. Now pick an arbitraryz ∈ Z and define a function r : Λ → R by r(p) = −δ(z, p), and the correspondence E : r(Z) × r (Λ) → 2 R by, a ∈ E(x, y) iff ∃ z ∈ Z, p ∈ Λ with r(e z ) = x, r(p) = y, andδ(z,p) = a.
The first step in the proof that these definitions form the basis of a DRPE representation is to note that r(e z ) ≥ r(e z 0 ) ⇐⇒δ(z, p) ≥δ(z 0 , p). To see this, note that by definition and application of A2*, for any p ∈ Λ and z, z 0 ∈ Z, r(e z ) ≥ r(e z 0 ) ⇐⇒δ(z, e z ) ≤δ(z, e z 0 ) ⇐⇒δ(z, e z ) ≤δ(z, e z 0 )
Substitution ofδ(z, e z ) =δ(z 0 , e z 0 ) in light of A3* followed by application of A1* then yields the desired conclusion,
Furthermore, given p, p 0 ∈ Λ and z ∈ Z, A2* implies
Given these connections between the functions r andδ, it is immediate that E is a function, since given p, p 0 ∈ Λ and z, z 0 ∈ Z with r(e z ) = r(e z 0 ) and r(p) = r(p 0 ),
It follows not only that E, r represent the DRF, but also that they respect dopaminergic dominance. To see that E is increasing in its first argument, note that, given any p ∈ Λ and z, z 0 ∈ Z with r(e z ) = x and r(e z 0 ) = y,
Thus, by definition, E(x, v) > E(y, v) for any v ∈ r(Λ).
A similar argument shows that E is strictly decreasing in its second argument, since given any z ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ with r(p) = x and r(p 0 ) = y, x > y ⇐⇒δ(z, p) <δ(z, p 0 ).
Hence r and E respect dopaminergic dominance. Finally, A3* directly implies that no surprise constancy is satisfied: given z, z 0 ∈ Z with r(e z ) = x and r(e z 0 ) = y,
=δ(z, e z ) (by A3) = E(y, y).
Thus r and E as defined above form a DRPE representation of δ : M → R, completing the proof.
Conditions for the Extension
According to Theorem 1, a DRF can admit a DRPE representation only if it has an extension that satisfies A1*-A3*. The manner in which we choose to establish existence of such an extension hinges on the observation that Λ ⊂ cl(Λ(z)) for all z ∈ Z, a fact that is established in Lemma 1 in the Appendix. Given this, it is intuitively clear that imposition of suitable continuity conditions will allow us to extend δ appropriately to the domain Z ×Λ.
In addition to a continuity axiom, we employ an additional "separation" axiom to ensure that this extension has appropriate properties.
5
Axiom 4 (A4: Uniform Continuity) The function δ : M → R is uniformly continuous.
Theorem 2 establishes that these conditions allow us to construct a unique, continuous extension of δ to Z × Λ which takes properties A1*-A3*. The central existence result of the paper, is then obtained by combining Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 2 Given that the DRF δ : M → R satisfies A1-A5, there exists a unique uniformly continuous function δ : Z × Λ → R that is an extension of δ and satisfies A1*-A3*.
Proof. Lemma 1 in the Appendix establishes that, for all p ∈ Λ and finite X ∈ 2 Z , p is a limit point of ∩ z∈X Λ(z).
and furthermore Z × Λ ⊂ cl(M ).. Hence under A4, the uniformly continuous function δ : M → R has a unique continuous extensionδ : Z × Λ −→ R. We show now that A1*-A3* hold for this function.
To confirm that A1* holds forδ :
By the continuity ofδ and the fact that p is a limit point of
With this, we know from axiom A5 that,
Applying continuity once more, we conclude thatδ(z, p 0 ) >δ(z 0 , p 0 ).
To confirm that A2* holds forδ : Z × Λ −→ R, consider z, z 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ such thatδ(z, p) >δ(z, p 0 ).
We need to show that as a resultδ(z 0 , p) >δ(z 0 , p 0 ). The first step is to note that, sinceδ is continuous, that any point in Λ is a limit point of
Our proof of A2* derives from showing that a similar, though not identical, string of inequalities applies to prize
The inner strict inequality, δ(z 0 , r) > δ(z 0 , s), follows from application of A2 to δ : M → R in light of the fact that δ(z, r) > δ(z, s). The first weak inequalityδ(z 0 , p) ≥δ(z 0 , r) is established by using the continuity ofδ and the fact that p is a limit point of Proof. Proposition 1 establishes that A1-A3 are necessary for a DRPE representation, while, given that the DRF satisfies A4 and A5, theorems 1 and 2 establish that they are sufficient.
Equivalent Reward Functions
It is important to note that the reward function r : Λ → R in the DRPE representation is not uniquely defined.
Proposition 2 shows in particular that any positive monotone transform of any given reward function will also form part of a DRPE representation.
Proposition 2 Let r : Λ → R and E : Z × Λ → R form a DRPE representation of a DRF δ : M → R.
Then for any functionr : Λ → R which is a strictly increasing monotone transform of r, there exists a function E :r(Z) ×r(Λ) such thatr,Ē form a DRPE .
Proof. Given thatr is a strictly positive transform of r, the proof of theorem 1 tells us that, given z, z 0 ∈ Z and
Thus the same proof tells us thatr together withĒ :r(Z) ×r(Λ) defined by, a ∈Ē(x, y) iff ∃ z ∈ Z, p ∈ Λ withr(e z ) = x,r(p) = y,δ(z,p) = a, form a DRPE representation.
Proposition 2 reveals that the reward error, the difference between the reward associated with a lottery and the realized prize, is ill-defined. Given (p, z), (p 0 , z 0 ) ∈ M , the difference between the actual reward from the prize and the expected reward from the lottery can be manipulated without any observable implications for the dopamine system: there exist functions r, r 0 : Λ → R that both represent the same DRF, yet with:
The situation is precisely as in utility theory, in which utility differences and marginal utility were shown to be undefined concepts for standard preference orderings. What this technical finding reveals in pragmatic terms is that the axioms that have been provided to date do not support the idea that dopaminergic responses can serve as a meaningful gauge either of the level of disappointment, or the level of positive surprise.
Additional Results
In this section we will establish specializations of the DRPE hypothesis that are of particular interest in various applied contexts. In so doing, we will throughout incorporate assumptions A1 through A5. This allows us to simplify our characterizations by making assumptions on the extended DRF,δ : Z × Λ −→ R, the unique uniformly continuous extension of δ : M −→ R.
Additivity
We explore first how to strengthen the DRPE axioms to ensure that dopaminergic responses define a rigid measuring rod for reward differences. The key is to establish conditions for an additive representation in which reward differences cannot be reversed within the class of equivalent representations. Note that while essentially similar conditions for additivity have been much studied in the prior literature (e.g. Debreu [1960] , Luce and
Tukey [1964] , Tversky [1964] , Fishburn [1970] and Wakker [1989] ), the supporting axioms, such as the "hexagon condition" have a technical rather than an intuitive meaning. Here we present an alternative characterization with a more intuitive interpretation.
Suppose that lotteries p and p 0 display dopaminergic responses to some prize z that are precisely equivalent to those that q and q 0 display with respect to some prize w. If reward differences are to be well defined, we would like to conclude from this that "the reward difference between lottery p and p 0 is equivalent to that between q and q 0 ." Hence if there are any two other prizes z 0 and w 0 such that the dopaminergic response to realization of z 0 from p 0 is equivalent to that of w 0 to q 0 , then it must equally be the case that the dopaminergic response to realization of z 0 from p is equivalent to that of w 0 to q. Analogously, if prizes z and z 0 display dopaminergic responses from lottery p 0 that are precisely equivalent to those that w and w 0 display from lottery q 0 , we would like to conclude that "the reward difference between lottery p and p 0 is equivalent to that between q and q 0 ." Hence, if there are any two other lotteries p and q such that the dopaminergic response to realization of z from p is equivalent to that of w to q, it must be the case that the dopaminergic response to realization of z from p 0 is equivalent to that of w to q 0 . Despite the apparent conceptual difference between the reward difference statements above as applied to lotteries and to prizes, a careful reading shows them to reduce to the following common assumption.
Axiom 6 (A6: Equivalent Differences) The extended DRFδ :
To establish the connection between equivalent differences and the existence of a DARPE representation, we exploit a powerful connection between the DARPE representation and existence of an additive representation of the binary relation of the DRF δ : M → R .
Proposition 3
The DRF δ : M → R admits a DARPE representation if it satisfies A3 and there exist functions
Proof. Suppose that there exist functions u : Z → R, v : Λ → R that satisfy this condition and that A3 is satisfied. We conclude immediately that given z, z 0 ∈ Z, δ(z, e z ) =δ(z 0 , e z 0 )
Hence, given z, z 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ,
This immediately implies existence of a DARPE representation, defining r : Λ → R by r(p) = −v(p), and specifying G(x) on x ∈ r(Z) − r(Λ) by identifying z ∈ Z and p ∈ Λ with r(e z ) − r(p) = x, and setting,
The fact that this specification G(x) is unambiguous is immediate in light of the definition of r(p) in relation to the additive representation ofδ.
The conditions under which a binary relation can be represented additively have been extensively studied both in economics and mathematical psychology. ). Fortunately, provided we insist on connectedness of the prize space, axioms A4 and A5 allow us to provide conditions for a DARPE representation based on the existing conditions for additivity due to Wakker [1989] . We make the following additional technical assumption to rule out trivial problems. Proof. Appendix.
Whereas for the DRPE representation we could say that any strictly monotone transformation of a given reward function r : Λ → R would also form part of a DRPE, this is not the case for the DARPE representation.
Here we can only guarantee that any positive affine transformation will preserve the DARPE structure.
Proposition 4 If r, G form a DARPE representation of δ : M → R, and r * : Λ → R is a positive affine transformation of r, then there exists G * : r * (Z) − r * (Λ) → R such that r * , G * define also a DARPE representation.
Moreover, if Z is connected and A4, A5 and A7 are satisfied, the class of r functions which additively represent the extended functionδ is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. Since r * is a positive affine transformation of r, we can write r * (p) = αr(p) + β with α, β ∈ R and α > 0.
As the proof of proposition 3 shows, we can thus find a function G * : r
Finally we need to show that under the conditions stated, if r : Λ → R and s : Λ → R are such that, for ∀ z, z 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 ∈ Λ,
This follows from the fact that r and s both form additive representations of the binary relation generated byδ(z, p) ≥δ(z 0 , p 0 ) on Z × Λ which (as demonstrated in the proof of theorem 4), satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem III 6.6 on pp 70 of Wakker [1989] . As shown by Observation III 6.6' on pp 71 of the same reference, the class of such representations are jointly cardinal, meaning that r and s must be positive affine transformations of each other.
Expected Reward
In this section we identify conditions that guarantee that the reward function in the DRPE representation can have an expected reward structure. This rules out such counter-intuitive phenomena as all prizes being negative surprises when realized from a particular lottery. The necessary condition is similar to that required for an expected utility representation in standard choice theory.
Axiom 8 (A8: Independence) Given z ∈ Z, p, p 0 ∈ Λ(z), and λ ∈ (0, 1],
Theorem 5 A DRF δ : M → R that satisfies A4 and A5 admits a DERPE representation if and only if it satisfies axioms A1-A3 and A8.
Proof (Axioms Imply Representation). Suppose that the DRF δ : M → R satisfies A1-A5 and A7. Now pick an arbitrary prizez ∈ Z, and define the binary relation
Note that this binary relation satisfies the standard axioms of EU theory: it is immediate that & D is complete and transitive; A8 establishes that the substitution axiom is satisfied; and continuity ofδ implies that given
in satisfaction of the Archimedean axiom. We conclude that there exists u : Z → R such that,
Moreover, as axioms A1-A3 are satisfied, we know that there exists functions s :
which form a DRPE representation of δ. Finally, as
is a strictly increasing transform of s, and as shown in proposition 2, this implies that there exists a function E such that E and r form an RPE representation.
Proof (Representation Implies Axioms). Suppose that δ : M → R permits a DERPE representation, and let r, E form such a representation. Existence of the DRPE alone implies that A1-A3 are satisfied. To see that A8 holds, note that, given z ∈ Z, p, p 0 ∈ Λ(z), q ∈ Λ and λ ∈ (0, 1],
The proof that this result extends, under A4, to the functionδ, is straightforward but lengthy and is included in Dean [2007] .
Dopamine and Choice
To make the connection between dopamine and the standard theory of utility maximization requires us first to ensure that this theory applies, by invoking the weak axiom of revealed preference. We then ensure that what the axiom says is chosen in any given pair accords with the dopaminergic responses. These assumptions are summarized in the following two axioms.
Axiom 9 (A9: WARP)
The choice correspondence C satisfies WARP.
Axiom 10 (A10: Dopamine and Choice Consistency) Given p, q ∈ Λ and z ∈ Z, δ(z, p) ≤δ(z, q) ⇐⇒ p ∈ C({p, q}).
Theorem 6 A DRF δ : M → R that satisfies A4 and A5 admits a choice consistent DERPE representation, with r : Λ −→ R continuous, if and only if it satisfies axioms A1-A3 and A9-A10.
Proof (Axioms Imply Representation).
Suppose that δ : M → R satisfies A1-A5 and A9-A10. Now construct the function r : Λ −→ R as in the proof of theorem 1. From the proof of this theorem we know both that such an r : Λ −→ R is continuous and that there exists an E such that r and E form a DRPE. Note that, with A9,
Since r is continuous and any set X ∈ Q is compact, arg max s∈X r(s) is always non-empty. Now we show that it must be the case that C(X) = arg max x∈X r(x). To show that C(X) ⊆ arg max x∈X r(x), note that p ∈ C(X) and q ∈ X such that r(q) > r(p) would imply by A10 that C({p, q}) = q, so that choosing p from the larger set X would contradict axiom A9, WARP. To show that C(X) ⊇ arg max x∈X r(x), suppose to the contrary that p ∈ arg max x∈X r(x), but p / ∈ C(X). Now consider some q ∈ C(X) and note that r(p) ≥ r(q), so that p ∈ C({p, q})
by A10. This again is a violation of axiom A9, WARP. Overall, we conclude that C(X) = arg max x∈X r(x), as required.
Proof (Representation Implies Axioms). Suppose that a DRF δ : M → R satisfies A4 and A5 and admits a choice consistent DERPE representation, with r : Λ −→ R continuous. We know from proposition 1 that the existence of a DRPE representation implies A1-A3. The fact that C is representable as the maximization of a binary relation implies that A9 holds. All that is left is to confirm A10, whereby given p, q ∈ Λ and z ∈ Z, δ(z, p) ≤δ(z, q) ⇐⇒ p ∈ C({p, q}).
Given that the DRPE is choice consistent, we know that p ∈ C({p, q}) ⇐⇒ r(p) ≥ r(q), hence what we need to show is that,δ
To prove this, first consider p, q ∈ Λ, z ∈ Z with r(p) < r(q). By the continuity of r, this implies that we will be able to find s, t ∈ Λ(z) such that r(p) < r(s) < r(t) < r(q).
By definition of the DRPE, given that (z, s), (z, t) ∈ M , r(s) < r(t) =⇒δ(z, s) >δ(z, t).
Furthermore, we will be able to find a sequence p n within Λ(z) such that lim n→∞ p n = p, so that r(p n ) < r(s) for high enough n, whereupon the DRPE property again implies thatδ(z, p n ) >δ(z, s). By continuity we conclude thatδ(z, p) = lim n→∞δ (z, p n ) ≥δ(z, s). A similar argument shows thatδ(z, t) ≥δ(z, q). Finally we conclude that r(p) < r(q) =⇒δ(z, p) >δ(z, q).
An analogous argument shows that, given p, q ∈ Λ, z ∈ Z,
We can finally conclude thatδ(z, p) ≤δ(z, q) ⇐⇒ r(p) ≥ r(q), completing the proof.
Concluding Remarks
The axiomatic framework above is the subject of ongoing experimental investigation in conjunction with the Center for Neural Science at NYU. The objectives of this research are to gauge how closely dopaminergic measurements conform to the various DRPE representations above, and how closely choices align with dopaminergic responses.
Given the restricted domain of lotteries that will be utilized in the laboratory, we are simultaneously refining our axioms to cover finite data sets.
Assuming that we find supporting evidence for the DRPE hypothesis, our next step will be to extend our theoretical and empirical work to allow for dynamic environments in which learning takes place. Richer axioms will be needed to connect the observed patterns of choice and dopaminergic response, and to fully characterize reinforcement learning models for such data. Ideally, this will be a prelude to a richer and more complete neuroeconomic theory of learning, possibly building on multiple process ideas such of those of Dickinson and Balleine (2002) .
In a methodological response to Gul and Pesendorfer, Caplin (2007) argues that there is much of economic interest to be learned through incorporation of non-standard data into axiomatic theory. In this respect, our current demonstration that axiomatic methods enable the neuroeconomic language barrier to be breached in the case of dopamine represents only a first move. The broad goal is to develop new theoretical and linguistic conventions for non-choice data that will enable new experimental findings to be fluidly incorporated into the corresponding economic frameworks. Caplin and Dean (2007) provide an entirely separate axiomatic example focused around the question of how long a subject takes to make a decision, and the light this sheds on models of the decision making process. At the same time, Louie and Glimcher [2007] have presented intriguing evidence concerning the insights that neuroscience can offer on this process of decision making. Given the many areas of common interest, it is clear that an expansive agenda will open up if early forays into formal neuroeconomic theory bear fruit.
8 Appendix: Proofs Lemma 1 For all p ∈ Λ and finite X ∈ 2 Z , p is a limit point of
Proof. For any X ⊂ Z such that |X| < ∞, every point in Λ is a limit point of ∩ z∈X Λ(z). To see this, take
np , wherep is the uniform lottery on X ∪ Supp(p), and note that, as p n (z) > 0 ∀ z ∈ X, it must be the case that p n ∈ ∩ z∈X Λ(z) for all n. As lim n→∞ d ∆(Z) (p, p n ) = 0, p is the limit point of
. To show that every point of Z ×Λ is a limit point of M , consider (z, p) ∈ Z ×Λ and construct a sequence (z, p n ) ∈ Λ(z) with p n ∈ Λ(z) and lim p n = p, so that by construction lim n→∞ (z n , p n ) = (z, p), completing the proof. Proof (Axioms Imply Representation). This proof relies on Theorem III.6.6 on page 70 of Wakker [1989] to show that we have sufficient conditions for the additive representation of the extension of the binary relation D to Z × Λ defined as (z, p) D (z 0 , p 0 ) if and only ifδ(z, p) ≥δ(z 0 , p 0 ). To do so, we need to show that the following conditions hold:
Theorem
1. Z and Λ are connected topological spaces: Z is connected by assumption, while Λ is convex with the obvious definitions, hence connected. These equivalences follows directly from the fact, established in theorem 1, thatδ satisfies A1*-A3*.
D satisfies the hexagon condition:
The hexagon condition follows from assumption A6. This assumption states that given z, z 0 , w, w 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 , q, q 0 ∈ Λ withδ(z, p) =δ(w, q),δ(z 0 , p 0 ) =δ(w 0 , q 0 ) andδ(z, p 0 ) = δ(w, q 0 ), it follows that,δ (z 0 , p) =δ(w 0 , q).
to establish the result we make the following identifications: p = l 00 ; p 0 = q = l 0 ; q 0 = l; z = a; z 0 = w = a 0 ; w 0 = a 00 .
With this equivalent differences asserts that ifδ(a, l 00 ) =δ(a 0 , l 0 ),δ(a 0 , l 0 ) =δ(a 00 , l) andδ(a, l 0 ) =δ(a 0 , l), thenδ(a 0 , l 00 ) =δ(a 00 , l 0 ), which is precisely the hexagon condition: given a, a 0 , a 00 ∈ Z and l, l 0 , l 00 ∈ Λ, if δ(a, l 0 ) =δ(a 0 , l); δ(a, l 00 ) =δ(a 0 , l 0 ) =δ(a 00 , l);
thenδ(a 0 , l 00 ) =δ(a 00 , l 0 ).
5. ∃ p, p 0 ∈ Λ and z, z 0 ∈ Z such that (z, p) B (z 0 , p) and (z, p) B (z, p 0 ): This follows directly from assumption A7.
The conditions of the theorem are therefore met (separability of Z and Λ are not necessary, see remark III.7.1). Thus we know that ∃ u : Z → R and v : Λ → R such that
Thus, as A3 holds, and by proposition 3 there exists an additive DRPE representation.
Finally, we have to show that r and G are continuous. To see this first note that, as u and v are continuous and non-constant above, then it is clear that the r function constructed according to the proof of proposition 3
will be continuous (and non-constant) on both Z and Λ. Thus we only have to show that G is continuous. To see this, let X be the range ofδ and Y = r(Z) − r(Λ). Note that, X and Y are intervals. To see this, note that Z × Λ is connected, that bothδ and r are continuous functions, and that the range of any continuous function on a connected domain is connected, and therefore constitute intervals in R. Next, note that G is a strictly increasing function from X to Y , and that it is onto. To see this, note that for any x ∈ X, ∃ (z, p) ∈ Z × Λ such that δ(z, p) = x. Letȳ =r(z) − r(p). By definition G(ȳ) = G(r(z) − r(p)) =δ(z, p) = x. Finally note that any strictly increasing, onto function mapping between intervals in R is continuous.
Proof (Representation Implies Axioms). Suppose that ∃ functions r : Λ → R and G : r(Z) − r(Λ) −→ R, with r non constant and continuous on both Z and Λ and G continuous and strictly increasing, that form a DARPE representation of the DRF. As the DARPE representation is a special case of a DRPE representation we know that A1-A3 must hold by proposition 1. A7 is implied by the fact that the function r in the representation is nonconstant on both Z and Λ. Finally, to prove A6 define the function G * : Z × Λ → R as G * (z, p) = G(r(z) − r(p)).
This function is by definition continuous, and, as G, r form a DARPE, we know that, for any (z, p) ∈ M , G * (z, p) = G(r(z) − r(p)) = δ(z, p).
Thus G * is a continuous extension of δ to Z × Λ. As such an extension is unique, it must be the case that ∀ z ∈ Z and p ∈ Λ, G(r(z) − r(p)) = G * (z, p) =δ(z, p).
This allows us prove A6 based on the implied relationship betweenδ and r. Given z, z 0 , w, w 0 ∈ Z and p, p 0 , q, q 0 ∈ Λ,δ (z, p) =δ(w, q) =⇒ r(e z ) − r(p) = r(e w ) − r(q); δ(z 0 , p 0 ) =δ(w 0 , q 0 ) =⇒ r(e z 0 ) − r(p 0 ) = r(e w 0 ) − r(q 0 ); δ(z, p 0 ) =δ(w, q 0 ) =⇒ r(e z ) − r(p 0 ) = r(e w ) − r(q 0 ).
This immediately implies,
r(e z 0 ) − r(p) = r(e w 0 ) − r(q) =⇒δ(z 0 , p) =δ(w 0 , q), completing the proof. The first panel shows an example in which A3 is violated -the dopamine released when prize 1 is obtained from its sure thing lottery is higher that that when prize 2 is obtained from its sure thing lottery.. In panel 2, A3 is satisfied: In this setting, A3 demands that the red line hits the left axis at the same value as the blue line hits the right.
Figure 1 Each graph shows hypothetical DRFs for an environment with two prizes. The 'x' axis defines the set of lotteries as
